

Message Text

SECRET

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 3187

EXDIS - HANDLE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PEPR, TU, CY, UN
SUBJ: CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) ANKARA 3159, (B) NICOSIA 1090

1. NATURALLY ENOUGH, THE PERSPECTIVE FROM THIS CAPITAL
IS DIFFERENT FROM THE VIEW FROM NICOSIA AS SET FORTH
IN REFTEL B.

2. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, KYPRIANOU SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO HAVE HIS CAKE AND EAT IT TOO, IE TO TELL
WALDHEIM PRIVATELY THAT HE WILL NOT SEND A REPRESENTATIVE
TO RECONVENED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, IF WALDHEIM DECIDES
TO CALL FOR THME, WHILE AVOIDING THE ONUS OF TAKING
SUCH A NEGATIVE STANCE IN PUBLIC. WE BELIEVE WALDHEIM
SHOULD BE URGED BY US AND BY OUR PRINCIPAL WESTERN
PARTNERS TO GO AHEAD AND CALL FOR RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL
TALKS. THERE IS AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY THAT KYPRIANOU
WILL, IN FACT, PARTICIPATE, PARTICULARLY IF, AS
SUGGESTED IN REFTEL A, IT IS MADE CLEARPUBLICLY
THAT WALDHEIM'S VIEW NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF ATTEMPTING TO WORK OUT A COMMON POSITION

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BETWEEN THE EXTREMES NOW SET FORTH BY BOTH SIDES.
I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY ANYONE SHOULD ASSUME NEGOTIATIONS
SHOULD, OR SHOULD HAVE TO, BE BASED ONLY ON TURKISH
PROPOSALS. I HAVE NEVER HEARD OF A NEGOTIATION WITH
SUCH A REQUIREMENT.

3. NATURALLY, KYPRIANOU WILL DO EVERYTHING HE

CAN TO INFLUENCE THE CONGRESS TO TAKE A NEGATIVE POSITION ON THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL TO LIFT THE EMBARGO BY DENIGRATING THE TRUKISH APPROACH AND TALKING ABOUT TURKISH INTRANSIGENCE. RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD UNDERCUT THIS EFFORT AS LONG AS THE EMBARGO IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION. IT IS ALSO NATURAL THAT HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING HE CAN TO GET THE TURKS TO "IMPROVE" THEIR PROPOSALS PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF ANY TALKS, SINCE THESE WILL DEFINE THE "STARTING POINT" FOR ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS OF THE TURKISH SIDE. NEVERTHELESS HIS POSITION TO ME SEEMS OBJECTIVELY UNSOUND, COMPARABLE TO THE US DECLARING THAT IT WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN SALT NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE SOVIETS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THOSE NEGOTAITIONS WERE "ACCEPTABLE", OR CONSTITUTED (BY SOME UNILATERAL SUBJECTIVE STANDARD) A "REASONABLE" FRAMWORK FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

4. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM, INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN AND IF THEY ARE RESUMED, WILL BE LONG AND DIFFICULT AT BEST. THE UNITED STATES CAN HAVE A REAL ROLE IN INFLUENCING THEM IF THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED; IF IT IS NOT, WE WILL HAVE NO INFLUENCE AND THE PROBABILITY IS THAT THE PRESENT DEFACTO SITUATION ON THE ISLAND WILL HARDEN AND PASS BEYOND THE POINT WHERE A SETTLEMENT CAN BE NEGOTIATED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. UDI WOULD BE A REAL POSSIBILITY. SINCE I SHARE MUCH OF
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THE SKEPTICISM OF WALDHEIM'S ABILITY TO DO THE JOB HIS POSITION REQUIRES, I BELIEVE THERE MAY WELL BE A REAL NEED FOR SOMEONE LIKE CLARK CLIFFORD IN DUE COURSE. I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS WILL LIE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL, NOT THE TERRITORIAL, AREA. THE TURKS, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, FUNDAMENTALLY BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY PROTECTION FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY LIES IN A STRUCTURE THAT GIVES THEM 50 PERCENT OF THE POLITICAL POWER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY ARE A MINORITY. THEIR PROPOSALS REFLECT THIS, AND I DO NOT THINK THERE IS MUCH NEGOTIATING LEEWAY IN THEM UNLESS, IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS OR OTHERS (INCLUDING OURSELVES) CAN PERSUADE THE TURKS THAT SOMEHOW PROTECTION FOR THE MINORITY CAN BE RECONCILED WITH A STRONG AND MORE AUTHORITATIVE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH ECEVIT FIRMLY BELIEVES CAN ONLY DEVELOP THROUGH EVOLUTION OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS. I FULLY AGREE WITH KYPRIANOU'S OBSERVATION THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE TURKISH APPROACH WOULD BE, FOR HIM AND FOR THE PRESENT GOC, "COMMITTING SUICIDE"--BECAUSE THERE IS NO WAY THAT I CAN SEE THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE OF CYPRUS,

OR ANYTHING VERY MUCH LIKE IT, CAN SURVIVE A
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. IT IS A LITTLE LIKE THE PROTESTANT RE-
ACTION TO "POWER SHARING" IN NORTHERN IRELAND. ON THE OTHER HAND,
I BELIEVE IT IS NONSENSE TO CLAIM THAT THE TURKS ARE SEEKING
A CYPRUS OF TWO SEPARATE STATES; ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE
THAT IS WHAT WE WILL END UP WITH IF NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT
RESUME REASONABLY SOON. IN ANY EVENT, THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTION WLL BE AN EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT ONE,
GIVEN THE BASIC TURKISH VIEW THAT THEY CANNOT,
WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THEIR ULTIMATE SAFETY, ACCORD
THE GREEK COMMUNITY 51 PERCENT OF THE POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
CHANGES WHICH MIGHT REASONABLY BE SUGGESTED IN THE TURKISH APPROACH
MAY BE IDENTIFIED DURING THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 3187

EXDIS - HANDLE AS NODIS

5. I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED, AGAIN PERHAPS WRONGLY,
THAT TERRITORY WILL BE A MUCH EASIER ISSUE. THE TURKS
REGARD CONSTITUTION-TERRITORY AS AN INTEGRAL ISSUE.
I BELIEVE THAT IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS BY SOME MIRACLE
ACCEPTED THE TURKISH APPROACH ON CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE--AND IT IS HARD TO SEE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS
DOING SO, CERTAINLY SO LONG AS THEY BELIEVE THERE IS
AN ALTERNATIVE--THE TURKS WILL BE PREPARED
TO MAKE MAJOR TERRITORIAL CHANGES, SETTLING FOR
SOMETHING UNDER 30 PERCENT, MAYBE EVEN AS LOW AS 26 PERCENT,
OF THE ISLAND. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE ADOPTED THE SAME APPROACH
THAT WE MIGHT WELL ADOPT WERE WE IN THEIR POSITION; THEY
HAVE BEEN CAUTIOUS AND VAGUE IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE
TERRITORIAL PROBLEM, PROBABLY FOR TWO FUNDAMENTAL
REASONS: A) ANY "CONCESSIONS" WOULD BE POCKETED BY
THE OTHER SIDE WITHOUT REGARD TO THE INTEGRAL NATURE

OF THE PROPOSALS, AND B) SPECIFIC AND FAR-REACHING
TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS WILL INEVITABLY CREATE DEEP
PROBLEMS AND DIVISIONS IN THE TURKISH COMMUNITY
ON CYPRUS THAT ECEVIT WOULD WANT TO AVOID FORCING
DENKTASH TO FACE UNTIL IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH
CONCESSIONS WOULD BE THE PRECIPITATING ELEMENT
FOR AN OVERALL SOLUTION. TO BE SPECIFIC AT THIS
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POINT WILL ALSO UNDERMINE FUTURE NEGOTIATING
FLEXIBILITY, SINCE ANY CHANGES FROM STARTING POSITION WILL BE
VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM AS "CAPITULATION". DESPITE THE POWERFUL
ARGUMENTS THAT CAN BE MADE FOR A MORE FORTHCOMING AND PUBLIC
OPINION-MINDED TURKISH APPROACH (FOR EXAMPLE, ON
VAROSHA) VIS-A-VIS CONGRESS, AS WELL AS THE TACTICAL
ADVANTAGES SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD GIVE THE TURKISH SIDE BY
CREATING TENSIONS IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY, I SUSPECT
THE FORMER ARGUMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO WEIGH MUCH MORE
HEAVILY WITH ECEVIT, WHO IS PERSONALLY BOTH THE
STRATEGIST AND A TACTICIAN IN THIS AREA. ANY POLITICIAN
TENDS TO WORRY MORE ABOUT THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS ON
HIS OWN DOORSTEP THAN THOSE A DEGREE OR TWO REMOVED.
EVEN IF I WERE TO GO TO HIM AND SAY THAT IT IS CLEAR
THAT THE PROSPECT OF LIFTING THE EMBARGO IS DOOMED
UNLESS THE TURKS CHANGE THEIR PRE-OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS
POSITION ON TERRITORY, I DOUBT THAT WE COULD MOVE HIM.
IN FACT, IT WOULD PROBABLY ONLY RAISE THE OLD EMOTIONAL SPECTRES
OF "LINKAGE" AND US INTERFERENCE". BASIC TO ALL OF
THIS IS THAT THE GREEKS WOULD LIKE US TO NEGOTIATE WITH
THE TURKS OVER CYPRUS. THE TURKS WILL NOT DO THIS.
THEY WANT TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE GREEKS. THIS

IS WHY THEY REFUSED OUR OVERTURES ABOUT SEEING THEIR
PROPOSALS AHEAD OF TIME. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW,
FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO GET INTO
THE POSITION OF NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF THE GREEKS
(IN NICOSIA OR ATHENS). WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE GREEKS
WILL SETTLE FOR AND WE SHOULD NOT START DOWN A ROAD
LEADING WHERE WE DO NOT KNOW.

6. THESE ARE RANDOM AND SOMEWHAT INCHOATE THOUGHTS,
BUT FROM MY PERSPECTIVE THEY POINT IN THREE DIRECTIONS:
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(A) PULL OUT ALL THE STOPS WE CAN TO GET WALDHEIM TO
CALL A MEETING, URGING THE BRITISH AND THE GERMANS,

AT LEAST, TO DO THE SAME-EVEN IF IT'S ACTUAL CONVOCATION IS DE-
LAYED FOR A WHILE; (B) KEEP TELLING THE TURKS--AS WE HAVE BEEN
DOING--THAT AT THE MOMENT THEY ARE ON THE LOSING END OF A PRO-
PAGANDA BATTLE, WITH OMINOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
APPROVAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL, AND THAT THEY SHOULD DO
EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO EMPHASIZE THE FLEXIBILITY THAT
THEY WILL SHOW WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS RESUME; AND
(C) WE SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO TRY TO GET THEM TO
MAKE SPECIFIC CHANGES IN THE PROPOSALS THEY HAVE NOW
GIVEN TO WALDHEIM PRIOR TO THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS.
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